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INTRODUCTION
One of the consistent features of politics in Africa, since the collapse
of the colonial system, is the rarity of constitutional change in
governments.' Since the first coup d'etat in 1952,2 a series of military
* Associate Fellow, Royal Institute of International Affairs, and Research
Fellow, School of Law, University of East London.
1. See infra notes 2-3 (discussing the various methods by which different
African governments have changed, the majority of which do not include
constitutional change).
2. See ERIC CARLTON. THE STATE AGAINST THE STATE, 160-71 (1997)
(describing the coup that overthrew King Faruq in Egypt on July 23, 1952).
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revolts and civil wars have instigated change in the governments of a
majority of African states In the wake of this method of political
change, more than one political or military faction has claimed to be
the government of a particular State at numerous times.' Although the
charter of the Organization of African Unity ("OAU") expressly
prohibits interference in a Member's internal affairs,' this provision has
been ignored on occasion and, as a result, a delegation's claim to be the
representative of a state has caused considerable controversy at OAU
summit meetings.' Also, in some instances, even though there has been
no dispute over who should represent a particular state at OAU
meetings, the OAU has still barred representatives from its
deliberations.7 As demonstrated in this paper, the OAU's reaction to
such situations has depended on the interplay of legal, social, and
political factors surrounding the delegation's volatility, which shapes
its responses to particular situations.
Moreover, the OAU has begun to develop a policy on constitutional
change that has as its crux the non-recognition of coups. This
3. See Adebayo Adedeji, Comprehending Afriican Conflicts, in
COMPREHENDING AND MASTERING AFRICAN CONFLICTS: THE SEARCH FOR
SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 1, 1-10 (Adebayo Adedeji ed.,
1999) [hereinafter COMPREHENDING AND MASTERING AFRICAN CONFLICTS]
(examining the violence plaguing the Sub-Saharan African continent, especially as
it relates to changes in government). By the end of 1998, thirty-three out of the
forty-eight Sub-Saharan countries had undergone periods of "political tumults,
violence, and brutalization." Id. at 5. Since 1998, there has been a coup in Cote
d'lvoire. Id. Only a few countries, including Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius, Sao
Tome & Principe, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, have been spared violent
changes of government since their independence. Id.
4. See Segun Odunuga, Nigeria: A Victim of its Own Success, in
COMPREHENDING AND MASTERING CONFLICTS 221, 22 1-28 (describing the events
leading up to a thirty month long Civil War with different factions claiming control
of different areas of the country).
5. See OAU CHARTER AND RULES OF PROCEDURE, art. 3, para. 2 [hereinafter
OAU CHARTER] (indicating the member states' adherence to the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states).
6. See infira notes 12-34 and accompanying text (describing the controversy
surrounding the seating of the Ghanaian delegation in the wake of the coup that
overthrew Nkrumah).
7. See infra notes 56-68 and accompanying text (discussing the OAU's refusal
to recognize the new regime of Liberia after a violent coup in 1980).
8. See infra Part VII (examining the OAU's recognition practices with regards
to coups and other non-democratically initiated changes of government).
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coincides with the link between democracy and socio-economic
development recently stressed by international organizations9 and
states.10 Given Africa's debilitating social and economic problems, if
9. See UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT AND
THE PROMOTION OF DURABLE PEACE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA;
TEXT PRESENTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318 (1998) (expressing the
current UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan's opinion of the importance of
democracy for development). The report states:
Democratic government helps to guarantee political rights, protect economic
freedoms, and foster an environment where peace and development can
flourish. Today, as never before, countries around the world are seeking to
establish pluralistic systems of government in which political leaders are
elected by the will of the majority to fixed terms of office and exercise their
authority within legal limits. This is a very hopeful trend for Africa's future
because in the absence of genuinely democratic institutions contending
interests are likely to seek to settle their differences through conflict rather
than through accommodation.
Id. at 18. Annan's predecessor as Secretary-General. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, also
emphasized the interrelationship between human rights and socio-political stability
when he wrote:
Democracy within nations requires respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, as set forth in the Charter. It requires as well a deeper
understanding and respect for the rights of minorities and respect for the
needs of the more vulnerable groups of society, especially women and
children. This is not only a political matter. The social stability needed for
productive growth is nurtured by conditions in which people can readily
express their will. For this, strong domestic institutions of participation are
essential.
BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, 70-71 (1995).
10. See TONY SMITH, AMERICA'S MISSION: TilE UNITED STATES AND TIlE
WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENrTIETHi CENTURY, 85 (1994)
(arguing that the foundation for American twentieth century foreign policy,
including the belief that democracy is the most peace-loving and only legitimate
form of government, and that the United States has a self-interested, as well as
moral, obligation to further its prospects abroad, was laid by President Wilson at
the beginning of the twentieth century). In particular, a resurgence of Wilson's
liberal democratic internationalism in America's foreign policy is evident in the
both President Bush I and President Clinton's policies. Id. at 312-45; see also
Edward N. Muller, Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality,
53 AM. SOC. REV. 50 (1988) (demonstrating that scholars, in addition to
international organizations and states, note the link between democracy and
income inequality by presenting the causal relationship between income inequality
and democratic experience within a country): Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and
World Politics, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1151 (1986) (claiming a close relationship
between democracy and political stability); R.J. RUMMEL, POWER KILLS:
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the OAU acts constructively on the recognition of democratic
governments it can emerge from its current dysfunctional state and start
to serve as a tool for the enhancement of economic prosperity and
political stability on the continent.' Notwithstanding its current
measures, however, this paper argues that the OAU's policy on
recognition does not go far enough and needs to be elaborated further
with rules that bind it to adhere to articulated and transparent
procedures.
This paper is thus an analysis of the recognition practice of the
OAU. Parts I through VI of the paper are case studies of the OAU's
recognition policy in practice. These studies examine instances when
the OAU has adhered to the international law principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of its members. The case studies also
discuss instances when the OAU has departed from its position of non-
interference. Insights into domestic and regional politics, the security
perceptions of some African states, and the OAU's internal
organization are examined to better understand how the OAU policy
has evolved. Part VII is an introduction to the OAU's recent
declaration on unconstitutional change of governments. Part VIII
explores methods to reinforce the substantive and procedural
dimensions of the declaration. The conclusion comments on the impact
of the OAU's new position on its future significance.
I. GHANA
The OAU's first major recognition problem involved the seating of'
the Ghanaian delegation sent to the sixth ordinary session of the OAU
DEMOCRACY AS A METHOD OF NONVIOLENCE, 85-89 (1997) (arguing that
democracy also contributes to domestic peace within a country).
11. See GEORGE B. AYITTEY, AFRICA IN CHAOS, 346 (1998) (describing the
irrelevance of the OAU by noting that although the mandate of the OAU includes
conflict resolution, the OAU has achieved the "unenviable distinction of being the
most useless organization on the African continent"). Ayittey describes the
delegates to the OAU as "a den of unrepentant despots" and notes that the
organization itself is known for "its glitzy annual jamborees, where rabid autocrats
click champagne glasses to celebrate longevity in office." Id. In addition, Ayittey
argues that they "use the OAU summit to extort aid from the international
community instead of taking the initiative to solve the continent's problems
themselves." Id.
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Council of Ministers1 2 by the then newly-established military junta in
Ghana, the National Liberation Council ("NLC").13 Kwame Nknmah,
one of the main architects behind the creation of the OAUY had been
overthrown in a coup in 1966.'" The arrival of the NLC's delegation
led to controversy among the OAU Members, some of whom
attempted to prevent it from participating in the Council of Ministers'
meeting. 16
The deliberations over the NLC's delegation revealed the emergence
of two clear positions on the issue of recognition.' 7 One group in the
Council maintained that as the NLC was now the de facto government
of Ghana, there should be no question about seating its delegates at the
meeting.'8 Although, ostensibly, this claim was based on the OAU's
principle of non-intervention in its Members' internal affairs and the
fact that the NLC had secured effective control of Ghana, there was
12. See OAU CHARTER, supra note 5, art. 7(2) (creating the Council of
Ministers as one of the organs of the OAU).
13. But see A. Bolaji Akinyemi, The Organization of.-Ifrican Unity anl the
Concept of Non-hteiference in Internal Affairs of Menber-States, in 46 TIlE
BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INT'L LAw 391, 399 (1975) (indicating that the issue of
recognition of governments actually first arose in 1963 as a result of the overthrow
and assassination of President Olympio of Togo). Although this took place before
the OAU was established, Togo's delegates were prevented from attending the
OAU's inaugural conference because of opposition from some states. hi. By July
of that year, however, the Togolese delegation was allowed to participate in OAU
meetings. See Costly Claims in Togo, W. AFR., July 27, 1963, at 832. (noting the
recognition by all African states of the new government of Togo).
14. See DAVID ROONEY, KWAME NKRUMAH: THE POLITICAL KINGDOM IN THE
THIRD WORLD, 203-36 (1988) (describing the role Nkrumah played in the creation
of the OAU).
15. See President Nk7-umnah Deposed b y the Armed Forces and Police, 3 AFR.
RES. BULL. 462, 465 (1966) (reporting about the coup d'etat by the Armed Forces
and an instance in which the police overthrew Nkrumah).
16. See C. 0. C. AMATE, INSIDE THE OAU: PAN-AFRICANISM IN PRACTICt, 423
(1986) (describing the events surrounding the NLC delegation's arrival to the sixth
ordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers).
17. See id. at 424 (describing the difference between the opposing sides of the
debate over the validity of the NLC delegation); see also infra notes 31-39
(analyzing the arguments of each side of the debate over the NLC delegation).
18. See id. at 423 (describing the states that recognized the NLC as the de facto
government).
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probably a subtler underlying factor.1'9 Nkrumah had been accused of
supporting attempts to overthrow certain African regimes2" as a means
of gaining influence and shaping the course of African unity on lines he
deemed appropriate. 2' Hence, his demise was seen by some of the
Members as an event that would improve their prospects of survival.22
On the other hand, other OAU Members23 tried to prevent the NLC's
delegation from taking its seat.24 These Members argued that foreign
governments, bent on eliminating Nkrumah because of his ideological
position and his radical Pan-Africanism, backed the NLC's coup.25 The
opposition members therefore believed that the NLC's delegation
represented a puppet regime whose existence was at odds with the
aspirations of the OAU, as articulated in its preamble.26 The argument,
therefore, was not that the NLC had not yet exercised effective control
over Ghana. Instead, the challenge to the NLC's delegation was based
19. See id. (noting that the same states that recognized the NLC as the de fticto
government of Ghana were also the states that in the past had accused the ousted
Ghanaian leader of masterminding subversive efforts against their governments).
20. See African Unity and Political Alignments, 2 AFR. RES. BULL. 311 (1965)
(describing some of the allegations of subversion measured against Ghana).
21. See KWAMENKRUNIAH, AFRICA MUST UNITE, 216-23 (1985) (arguing for a
continental government for Africa). Nkrumah believed in a surrender of state
sovereignty with economic planning on a continent-wide basis. Id. In addition, he
argued for a unified military and defense strategy capable of defending Africa from
an external attack as well as a unified foreign policy. Id. Ile was also a proponent
of a continental constitution implying a single government for all of Africa. Id.
22. See Amate, supra note 16, at 423 (stating that the coup in Ghana ended tile
dispute between Ghana and those countries that had been accusing Ghana of'
subversive efforts against them).
23. See The Seating of Ghana, W. AFR., Mar. 5, 1966, at 281 (naming Guinea,
Mali, and Tanzania as the main advocates for non-recognition of the credentials of
the NLC's delegation).
24. See id. (reporting about the heated debate over the recognition of the NCL
delegation).
25. See Amate, supra note 16, at 423 (describing that the opponents to the
recognition of the NLC delegation believed that the overthrow of Nkrumah was the
work of international imperialism, which they condemned).
26. See OAU CHARTER, supra note 5, pmbl. (stating that the member-states of
the OAU are committees, among other things, to fight against neo-colonialism in
all its forms).
27. See JOSEPH G. AMAMOO, THE GHANAIAN REVOLUTION, 45-46, (1988)
(noting that by the time the OAU Council of Ministers meeting had begun, the
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on perceptions of neo-colonialism, considerations of Pan-Africanism,
and Nkrumah's role in the struggle to dismantle the colonial system.2"
At the end of the discussions, the faction that supported the NLC
prevailed and the Council decided to seat the Ghanaian delegation.9 In
response, some of the anti-NLC delegation withdrew from the meeting
in protest.3 0
The reaction to the coup in Ghana and the seating of the NLC
delegation amounted to a triumph of legalism in the OAU. It was
obvious, that at this stage, the OAU had accepted the international law
principle of effective control as one of the primary conditions for
recognition of governments. Also, the seating of tie Ghanaian
delegation was indicative of the OAU's reaffirmation of the principles
of Article 3(2) of its Charter on non-interference.-"
In addition, apart from the commitment to legalism, a number of
political factors influenced the OAU's decision to accept the new
Ghanaian delegation. First, the anti-colonial tenets and utterances,
effective control of the NLC was not in doubt since all resistance to the coup ended
on the same day it was executed).
28. See Amate, supra note 16. at 423-24 (discussing the arguments for and
against the recognition of the NLC delegation).
29. See AMAMOO, supra note 27, at 48 (describing the events surrounding
Nkrumah's Foreign Minister's failure to appear at the summit). Nknimah thus lost
the opportunity to persuade the Council of Ministers to bar the NLC's delegation
form the meeting. Id. Perhaps the absence of Nkrumah's foreign minister tilted the
majority opinion in the Council towards the NLC. See also The Seating oJ'Ghana,
supra note 23, at 281. In handling this dispute, the OAU may have taken guidance
from the United Nations. See Recognition b* the United1 Nations ofi the
Representation of a Member State. G.A. Res. 396(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess.,
Supp. No. 20 at 24, U.N. Doe. A/1775 (1950) (adopting a resolution that asserted
that whenever there is a dispute between more than one authority claiming to
represent a government in the UN that becomes a subject of controversy, the issue
should be considered in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and
the circumstances of each case). Even if the UN model, which presupposes
competing claims, was used for guidance in this case. the OAU has demonstrated
its willingness to expel a delegation without hearing claims of a rival faction
claiming to be the government of a given state. See infra notes 54-68 and
accompanying text (discussing the case of Liberia in 1980).
30. See Amate, supra note 16, at 424 (identifying Algeria, Egypt, Guinea,
Kenya, Mali, Tanzania, and Somalia as the countries that left the OAU meeting in
protest).
31. See OAU CHARTER, supra note 5, art. 3(2) (indicating the member states'
adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states).
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typical of the OAU in its beginning, were no longer influential because
1966 marked the end of the dynamic period of the OAU's first two
years. The small group of so-called radical states,22 such as Algeria,
Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, and Uganda, which had
considerable influence when the OAU was established, saw its fortuncs
decline when two of its leaders, Ben Bella of Algeria," and Nkrumah
were overthrown. 4 By 1966, the moderates, with their focus on
economic cooperation, dominated the debates and shaped opinion in
the OAU.35 With the moderates in control, the radical's justification for
expulsion-that the government had been unstable with the aid of
imperialist powers-was not going to win much support.'
Second, the founders of the OAU had deliberately created a weak
32. See Zdenek Cervenka, Major Policy Shifts in the Organization oflAfrican
Unit 1963-1973, in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF AFRICAN STATES 323, 333 (K.
Ingham ed., 1974) (identifying the radical states that dominated the OAU during its
first couple of years).
33. See id. (stating that the radical group of the OAU lost one of its major
leaders with the death of Ben Bella); see also ARSLAN HUMBARACI, ALG(:RIA: A
REVOLUTION THAT FAILED, 263 (1966) (quoting a member of the military junta
that ousted Bella as saying, "The era of noisy speeches, of vulgar catchwords and
of impulsive frenzy is over," indicating Algeria's more sober foreign policy). Blen
Bella was overthrown in a coup in 1965. SeeA Person Again, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8,
1980, at 42. His replacement as head of state, Houari Boumedienne, shifned from
Ben Bella's fiery radicalism to a more practical approach. See Humbaraci, stqra at
263. Although the new government continued to support "radical African causes"
such as aid for guerrilla movements seeking to topple colonial regimes, the amount
of aid was limited to a smaller number of groups and was given with much less
brazenness than was the case under Ben Bella. Id.
34. See Cervenka, supra note 32 at, 333 (describing the loss of the radical
group's leadership). The radicals' cause was further damaged when the NLC'
restored links with Britain, which had been broken by Nkrumah in the wake of the
Rhodesia affair. See ANTON BEBLER, MILITARY RULE IN AFRICA: DAHIOMEY,
GHANA, SIERRA LEONE AND MALI, 40-41 (1973). The NLC also consolidated links
with other Western countries such as the United States. Id. In addition, the NL('
made a point of shutting down camps established by Nkrumah to train freedom
fighters. See KWAME NKRUMAH, DARK DAYS IN GHANA, 139-40 (1968).
35. See Cervenka, supra note 32, at 333 (discussing the influence wielded by
the moderate states in the OAU since 1966 and their focus on economic
cooperation); see also JON WORONOFF, ORGANIZING AFRICAN UNITY, 592-97
(1970) (detailing the rise of the moderates in the OAU).
36. See The Seating of Ghana, supra note 23 (reporting that the radical's
argument lost its force and the Ghana delegation was seated without further
questioning of their credentials).
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organization.3" The Charter forbade member states from interfering in
the affairs of the other member states and declared sovereign equality
of all members.38 Hence, the very thinking of its Members, coupled
with the powers given to it, made the OAU virtually powerless to deal
with coups, even if they resulted in the overthrow of governments that
were staunchly committed to its goals."
The emergence of differences among tie Members and the role of
rival African organizations further diluted the OAU's effectiveness.
The OAU had to confront rival African organizations, some of which
had similar goals and were capable of attracting a lot of its Members."u
Thus, this contest for dominance on the continent made any radical
decisions about Article 3(2) virtually impossible. If the OAU was seen
as asserting too much influence this could have easily set off a
defection by some of its Members to rival African organizations. "
Moreover, the Members of the OAU may have based their decision
to seat the Ghanaian delegation after a cost-benefit analysis.
Continuing to seat delegates of ousted regimes would probably be too
burdensome for it in its formative years. After all, what role would the
outside regime play since they would not be in a position to implement
OAU resolutions or the provisions of the Charter? Would such a move
result in a situation where the majority of OAU Members were
governments-in-exile? 2 In addition. how could the OAU collect
37. See Woronoff, supra note 35. at 331 (stating that the OAU charter was
strangely silent on ways and means for the organization to maintain order in
Africa).
38. See OAU CHARTER, supra note 5, art. 3(l) and (2) (declaring each
member-state's adherence to the principle of sovereign equality and non-
interference in the internal affairs of states).
39. See Woronoff, supra note 35, at 331-33 (discussing the OAU's difficulty in
resolving disputes between member-states, and especially within member-states).
40. See BOUTROs BOUTROS-GHALI. THE ADDIS ABABA CHARTER 50 (1964)
(questioning whether the larger grouping of African nations provided by the OAU
will help in unification, or whether smaller focused regional organizations will be
more affective on the African continent).
41. See id. (presenting the issues associated with the competition between the
OAU as a single continental organization and smaller, regional associations of
states in terms of reaching African unification).
42. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing the frequency of
violent governmental change). The possibility of an organization consisting in a
majority of governments-in-exile's delegations was quite possible given the
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contributions from non-recognized regimes and what implications
would this have for its financial health and survival? Hence, the
decision taken to accept coups (and other forms of unconstitutional
political change), as a fait accompli was most likely based on
institutional self-interest as well as legal and political considerations.
II. UGANDA
The issue of the recognition of a new military regime again became
a matter of intra-OAU controversy when Idi Amin overthrew the
government of Milton Obote in Uganda in 1971." 3 Amin and the
deposed government sent rival delegations to the OAU's sixteenth
session of the Council of Ministers. Again this clash of factions
resulted in the polarization of opinions on recognition." The faction
opposing Amin's delegation argued that it was not certain whether the
new junta had effective control over Uganda.45 Opposition to Amin's
delegation probably stemmed from his declaration that he intended to
remain in the British Commonwealth, notwithstanding Britain's sale of
arms to South Africa, while Obote had indicated his inclination to
withdraw Uganda from the organization on this issue.' Amin's
position was thus unacceptable to some of the OAU's Members. Other
factors adding grist to the mill of the pro-Obote faction included the
participation of six Israeli advisors in Amin's delegation and some
African countries growing animosity toward Israel. 7
number of coups that had already occurred and the likelihood of more to come. i.
43. See Uganda: Coup d'etat, 8 AFR. RES. BULL. 1993 (1971) (describing tile
coup d'etat against the government of Milton Obote).
44. See Session Postponed, W. AFR., Mar. 12, 1971, at 290 (stating that support
for Obote's regime principally came from Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and
Zambia, while Members such as Ghana, Liberia, and Nigeria supported the seating
of Amin's delegation).
45. See id. (citing no clear indications that Amin controlled the entire country).
46. See James H. Mittleman, The Anatomy of a Coup: Uganda, /971, Xl At:R.
QUARTERLY 184, 187 (1971) (detailing the circumstances surrounding Obote's
threat and his role in refusing student protests). Obote's threat to withdraw the
Commonwealth over British arms sales to South Africa in 1971, the very month in
which Amin overthrew his government, was surprising, since he had been
criticized in October of 1970 for refusing to permit students to march to the British
High Commission in Kampala in protest against the arms to South Africa policy.
47. See JOEL PETERS, ISRAEL AND AFRICA: THE PROBLEMATIC FRIENDStIII' 51-
54 (1992) (surveying the deterioration of the relationship between Israel and
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The group that supported the seating of Amin's delegation noted that
delegates from the new government had already participated in a
meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa."
Thus, in effect, the new regime had already been "recognized" as the
government of Uganda. In addition, as was the case with the overthrow
of Nkrumah, a number of African governments saw Uganda under
Obote as a threat to their security. 9 His removal therefore meant there
was one less subversive state to worry about.
The impasse at the OAU continued and neither delegation was
seated. 0 This was due to the role played by Members in key positions
within the OAU at the time." These States provided the necessary
support for Tanzania's concerns about the coup and, consequently,
made it possible to prevent the seating of Amin's delegation.-
However, at the Council's session in June of that same year, Amin's
delegation was seated without any controversy.
III. LIBERIA 1980
Another recognition controversy at the OAU arose as a result of the
1980 coup in Liberia. 4 Measures adopted by some OAU Members and
African countries).
48. See Session Postponed, supra note 44. at 290 (stating that Ghana's
delegation pointed out the pro-Amin delegation's participation).
49. See id. (explaining that although there was support for the seating of Amin's
delegation, the countries that opposed the seating focused on the confusion and
uncertainty facing Uganda as the reasons for insecurity).
50. See Amadu Sesay, The OA U and Regime Recognition: lolitics of Discord
and Collaboration in Africa, 4 SCANDINAVIAN J. OF DEV. ALTERNATIVES 25
(1985) (describing the sequence of events that prevented either delegation from
being seated).
51. See id. at 33 (identifying that Guinea, Somalia and Zambia, all regarded as
radicals and close to Obote, held the positions of OAU Secretary-General,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Chairman of the OAU, respectively.).
52. Id.
53. See id. (explaining how Zambia and Somalia's loss of their positions
equated to the removal of an obstacle which allowed Amin's delegation to be
seated).
54. See Liberia: Coup Topples Tolbert. 17 AFR. RES. BULL. 5645, 5645-50
(1980) (including the assassination of the President William Tolbert and the
execution of thirteen of his senior government officials as consequences of the
military coup).
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implicitly supported by the others amounted to the non-recognition of'
the new Liberian regime. Nigeria, for example, refused permission for
Liberia's new Foreign Minister to attend the OAU economic summit in
Lagos.55
Although this measure was a unilateral decision, it received the tacit
approval of the summit's participants.56 This decision was later
justified by the OAU on the ground that since the summit was
exclusively for heads of state, a mere foreign minister could not
attend.57 Another theory suggests that the real basis for the OAU's
concern was that it had scheduled an extraordinary summit in Nigeria
on the economic problems of Africa during which Tolbert, in his
capacity as the OAU Chairman, would preside."8 Consequently,
Tolbert's death raised the issue of whether Samuel Doe, the coup
leader, would assume the chairmanship of the OAU and preside over
the meeting.5 9
These factors alone, however, do not explain the OAU's reaction.
They were probably secondary and possibly irrelevant considerations
that merely cloaked the OAU Members' underlying fears. The real
concern lay in the composition of the forces that had deposed Tolbert's
administration. The coup had been planned and executed by Non-
Commissioned Officers ("NCOs") in the Liberian army."' The
conspirator with the highest rank was Doe himself, he was a master
sergeant.6 The fear now was that a new class of coup-makers had burst
55. Id. at 5650.
56. See id. (noting no dissent among representatives of the fifty-member
organization).
57. See id. (undermining this explanation was the fact that only half of' the
OAU heads of states attended and that numerous foreign ministers also
participated).
58. See Edward Kannyo, The Banjul Charter on Human and People 's Rights:
Genesis and Political Background, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN
AFRICA 128, 135-36 (Claude E. Welch, Jr. & Ronald I. Meltzer eds., 1984)
(forcing the OAU to confront the issue of succession to power in Liberia).
59. Id. at 136.
60. Liberia: Coup Topples Tolbert, supra note 54, at 5645 (1980).
61. Liberia: PRC Members Named, 17 AFR. RES. BULL. 5637 (1980) (listing
other members of the People's Redemption Council, the military junta established
after the coup, which included two staff sergeants, four sergeants, eight corporals,
and one soldier first-class).
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onto the scene in Africa. The loyalty and control of the relatively small
number of majors and generals no longer sufficiently guaranteed the
survival of a regime; the larger mass of NCOs also had to be contended
with. This further jeopardized the already precarious security situation
existing in almost all African countries. Therefore, if only to deter other
NCO's, condemnation of Doe's coup was necessary. The reaction of
some African states in the past illustrates this point. For example, in
1979 reaction to events in Ghana in which junior officers of the armed
forces seized power,62 with the overwhelming support of NCOs
demonstrates fear of coups. 63 They established a junta with NCOs
making up half of the membership6' and proceeded to execute eight
senior officers of the armed forces. Nigeria's reaction resulted from its
concern that their junior officers and NCOs would follow suit." -
Consequently, the actual execution of Tolbert and other members of
his government did not constitute the real source of the OAU's outrage;
the identity of those that had not only planned but performed the
killings truly fueled the OAU's outrage. ' However, once the Doe
administration indicated that executions would cease," ' his government
was seated at the next OAU annual summit.68 The implication of the
62. See Ghana: Militaiy Coup. 16 AFR. REs. BULL. 5306 (1979) (following
fighting on June 4, 1979, a new military administration called the Armed Forced
Revolutionary Council seized power in Ghana).
63. See Amamoo, supra note 27. at 190 (depicting the massive support of
NCO's).
64. See Ghana: Military Coup, supra note 62, at 5306 (1979) (including a
warrant officer, private, corporal, lance corporal, and staff sergeant). The new ten-
member military administration was called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.
It included a Warrant Officer, Private, Corporal. Lance Corporal and Staff Sergeant.
Id.
65. See BARBARA E. OKEKE. 4 JUNE: A REVOLUTION BETRAYED 55, 55-56
(1982) (stating that Rawling's popularity and the approval of the objectives of the
Ghanian revolution constituted threats to all corrupt governments, including
Nigeria)
66. See Liberia: Coup Topples Tolbert, supra note 54, at 5648-49 (pronouncing
the feelings of the OAU in light of the upcoming summit conference).
67. See id. at 5650 (announcing that Liberia would halt the execution of
political prisoners on April 29, 1980).
68. See OAU: Summit Conference. 17 AFR. Ri-S. BULL. 5730 (1980)
(describing the seventeenth summit conference of the OAU, which occurred in
July 1980). Doe's delegation was seated at the OAU's Seventeenth Annual Summit.
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Liberia controversy for the OAU was that legalism, so clearly upheld in
the question over the seating of the NLC delegation from Ghana, had
been ignored, albeit temporarily. This also demonstrated that Linder
certain circumstances legalism would have to yield to political
expediency and/or moral outrage.
IV. CHAD
In 1982, two delegations claiming to represent Chad arrived at the
OAU's meeting of Foreign Ministers in Libya.69 One delegation,
representing the faction led by Hussein Habre, insisted on participating
in the meeting since it was in effective control of Chad." This claim
was correct. As a result of a civil war, Habre had overthrown President
Goukhouni Oueddei earlier in the year" and meaningful resistance
ended when Oueddei fled to Cameroon.72 However, another delegation
representing Oueddei arrived at the meeting also demanding to be
seated as the official Chadian delegation.7 3 Libya, the host government,
led the countries that supported this delegation's claim.74
Libya argued that Habre's government was not the true
representative government of Chad.75 This was based on the claim that
69. See Eddie Momoh, A Time for Compromise, W. AFR., Nov. 22, 1982, at
3006 (documenting the disagreement among OAU Foreign Ministers as to which
delegation should be recognized as the legitimate representatives of Chad).
70. See id. (stating that the moderate countries supported this contention).
71. Chad: Habre Comes Back, 19 AFR. RES. BULL. 6489 (1982).
72. Id.
73. Momoh, supra note 69, at 3006.
74. Id.; see Mario J. Azevedo & Emmanuel U. Nnadozie, CtlAD: A NATION IN
SEARCH OF ITS FUTURE 114-24 (1998) (analyzing the factors influencing Libya's
anxiety about the regime in control of Chad, such as Libya's territorial claims to
the Chad's Aouzou Strip, as well as Colonel Gadaffi's view that Libya should
unite the Arab states since he had always viewed Chad as an Arab country); see
also Sam Nolutshungu, LIMITS OF ANARCHY: INTERVENTION AND STATI
FORMATION IN CHAD 147 (1996) (concluding that Gadaffi also wanted to avoid a
situation whereby Chad's government would have close links with foreign powers
opposing him, like France, and that Habre posed such a threat since he had long
declared himself an enemy of Libya and an alliance between him, France, and
Sudan was viewed as a threat).
75. See Momoh, supra note 69, at 3006 (claiming that Habre represents only a
fraction of Chad, not the entire country).
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Oueddei was organizing resistance to Habre in Chad's northern radical
region and, therefore, Habre lacked popular support."" Moreover, if the
OAU gave its support to Habre's delegation by seating it, rebels could
construe this to mean that it supported the overthrow of its Members. 7
In Libya's view, the OAU the should demonstrate its support for ex-
president Oueddei, as a number of African countries faced similar civil
rebellions.78 Libya also alleged that Habre's government would serve
as a pawn for imperialist powers in Africa by turning Chad into an
"imperialist base," with the possibility that Chad would become the
source of instability not only in Africa, but particularly in the six
countries on its borders.79
Libya's contention was wrong. If the claim that Habre's government
lacked a popular base were to apply to all delegations sent to the OAU,
virtually all of them would be denied the right to participate in that
organization's meetings. By 1982, few truly representative
governments existed in Africa. Military dictators or civilian presidents-
for-life ruled the overwhelming number of OAU member states.
Assumption of power and change of government through the ballot box
was an extremely rare occurrenceY' Nevertheless, these
unrepresentative governments participated freely in OAU meetings.
Thus, the Libyan claim concerning the representative nature of Habre's
76. Id.
77. See OAU: Second Summit Failure, 19 AFR. RES. BULL. 6640, 6641 (1982)
("if we were to recognize the usurpation of authority in N'Djamena, then we would
have to recognize all those usurpations ... It would be a serious precedent to
recognize a rebel minister of defense.") (quoting Colonel Gadaffi's perspective on
Chad).
78. Id.
79. See id. (quoting Colonel Gadaffi as saying, "All the African states
neighboring Chad will pay the price of their recognition of Habre when Chad turns
into an imperialist base. We can never allow a regime in the heart of Africa to
become an imperialist base.")
80. See generally Yusuf Bangura, Authoritarian Rule and Denocracy, in Africa:
A Theoretical Discussion 1991 UN Res. Inst. for Soc. Dev. § 2.3 (explaining that
military and one-party regimes eventually came under pressure to adopt programs
to shift the countries to multi-party rule).
81. See generally id. at § 2 (reflecting that the attitudes of Africa's ruling elite
toward the multi-party system of government and free elections became clear as
soon as they won independence because the general consensus was that Africa
could not afford the socio-political cost of such a system).
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delegation could not be supported in light of the OAU's practice. Even
if the Libyan position stated that the consent of the people meant their
acquiescence to the new government and not necessarily their
enthusiastic and voluntary support, 2 neither the facts, nor an analysis
of the OAU charter, would support this argument. As noted above,
Oueddei had been defeated and had fled the country. As a result, all
meaningful resistance to the rebellion had ended. Therefore, that
crucial act of acquiescence had occurred in the minds of the bulk of
Chadians. Moreover, even if the later attempts by Oueddei to establish
a foothold in the northern part of Chad were significant, Hlabre's
administration did not have any ground for non-recognition of because
of a lack of acquiescence. Prior to the Chad recognition controversy,
some well-established African governments, such as Angola and
Mozambique, in effective control of a greater part of their territories,
faced rebel uprisings. However, these rebel uprisings had never been
used to question their claim to represent their states at OAU meetings.
Moreover, the OAU has never claimed seating delegations from
usurpers implicitly supported such means of political change in Africa.
The OAU believes that the change of government is an internal affair."
As noted above, attempts to prevent participation by rebel governments
from Ghana and Liberia in OAU meetings represented a departure,
albeit a failed one in the long run, from the norm. The change of'
government falls within the scope of Article 3(2) of the OAU's
82. Policy makers have found that in many coups the concept of actual consent
expressed through popular support for the overthrow of a government is
meaningless. As one US State Department memorandum noted:
Most coups occur in less developed countries which have predominantly
illiterate and politically dormant populations. The coup is usually quick,
bloodless, and effective. Moreover, such changes in government usually
occur in one-party states, and take the form of one elite replacing another
elite, political, or military. In such circumstances the popular will remains
largely irrelevant. In the absence of popular revolution or a clear division of'
allegiance within the country, the consent or acquiescence of the population
must, as a practical matter, be taken for granted.
See L. Thomas Galloway, Recognizing Foreign Governments: The Practice of the
United States 7 (1978) (quoting Memorandum dated June 1, 1971, from the US
Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser).
83. See OAU CHARTER, supra note 5, art. 3(3) (demanding respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to
independent existence).
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Charter.8 4
It is unclear whether Habre became a puppet of imperialism and
therefore lent his active support to external forces bent on destabilizing
Africa. However, it did not provide a good reason for excluding a
delegation from an OAU meeting. Although the OAU's Charter
mentions the defeat of colonialism as an objective,5 being a tool of
imperialism has never been a barrier to membership. The OAU
membership rules clearly state that the organization invites the
participation of independent, sovereign African States." Nothing in the
OAU's charter precludes a government of a Member State from
participating in OAU summits because of its foreign relations.
Furthermore, the Members of the OAU finally agreed on a
compromise solution on the issue of Chad's representation. 7 This
agreement recognized the right of Habre's delegation to participate in
the summit meeting over Oueddei's claims." However, the concession
requested, but not granted was that Habre himself voluntarily stay
away from the Summit. 9
The de facto amendment to the OAU Charter frustrated the Habre
delegation. This amendment created the position of OAU Chairman,
even though the OAU Charter itself does not provide for such
position. 90 A merely ceremonial position, the Chairman lacks any
84. See OAU CHARTER, supra note 5, art. 3(2) (making it an intention of the
OAU to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of member states).
85. See OAU CHARTER. supra note 5. art. 2(l)(d) (-To eradicate all forms of
colonialism from Africa").
86. See OAU CHARTER, supra note 5. art. 4 ("Each independent sovereign
African State shall be entitled to become a Member of the Organization").
87. See OAU: Second Summit Faihure, 19 AFR. RES. BULL. 6640, 6641 (1982)
(explaining that the members of the OAU formulated a compromise, but it was
rejected by the Chadian Foreign Minister).
88. See id. (pointing out that the compromise allowed for the recognition of
Habre's delegation, but called for him to voluntarily abstain from being seated at
the summit).
89. See id. (recognizing that the compromise suggested that Habre reffrain
from attending the summit, therefore, leaving the Chad seat empty and preventing
the required thirty-one members for a quorum to hold an effective meeting).
90. See GINO J. NALDI. THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY: AN ANALYSIS
OF ITS ROLE 14 (1989) (providing for practices and procedures that are not actually
outlined in the OAU Charter).
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executive powers. However, over the years the position has gained
prestige9' as the Chairman emerged as the official spokesman of the
OAU. The parties exploited this role and the influence surrounding it
during the negotiations on the representation of Chad.
V. LIBERIA 1990
In 1989 a rebel army, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia
("NPFL") took up arms against the regime of Samuel Doe. 2 The
NPFL effectively destroyed the Doe administration and by June of
1990, it had nearly eradicated all meaningful resistance by government
forces to its military offensive.93 The Economic Community of West
African States ("ECOWAS") decided to intervene in the Liberian
conflict at this late stage.94 ECOWAS' measures made it possible to
create Liberia's Interim Government of National Unity ("IGNU").95
The IGNU was installed in the capital, Monrovia, under the protection
of the ECOWAS expeditionary force, the ECOWAS Ceasefire
Monitoring Group ("ECOMOG"). For the three years that it existed
the IGNU had no army or police force of its own and ECOMOG was
responsible for its safety.97 Moreover, the ECOWAS-IGNU alliance
never controlled any territory beyond Monrovia, and its immediate
91. See id. (institutionalizing the practice of placing the host Head of State as
chairman of OAU until subsequent summit).
92. See ABIODUN ALAO, ET AL., PEACEKEEPERS, POLITICANS, AND WARLORDS:
THE LIBERIAN PEACE PROCESs 20-24 (1999) (explaining the event that started the
Liberian civil war).
93. See ABIODUN ALAO, THE BURDEN OF COLLECTIVE GOODWILL (1998)
(providing a general history of the Liberian civil war).
94. See ALAO, supra note 92, at 28 (citing inaction by the United States and the
international community as the reason why the ECOWAS chose to intervene in the
Liberian civil war).
95. See Peter da Costa, Interim Leaders Emerge, W. AFR., Sept. 10, 1990, at
2438 (reporting that in Gambia, in August 1990, ECOWAS organized a
conference, attended by over fifty delegates from Liberian political parties, interest
groups, and concerned citizens, after the election of Amos Sawyer, President of
Liberia). The assembly also agreed on an interim national legislative assembly
consisting of thirty-five members. Id.
96. See ALAO, supra note 93, at 65-66 (1998) (discussing the success of
ECOMOG's mission for peace in Liberia).
97. Id.
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outskirts.98
Thus, the important question is why did the OAU seat the IGNU?
The OAU's recognition of IGNU is particularly perplexing because the
IGNU was not the de jure government of Liberia when the NPFL
launched its uprising. If the IGNU had been the de jure government it
could have argued for the presumption of recognition until the NPFL
dealt the coup de grace.99 However, as noted above, the IGNU was
installed and was being protected by a foreign force-ECOMOG. In
effect, the IGNU was a rebel faction in the conflict relying on an
outside force to help it assert its claims. Its status as a rebel faction is
supported by the fact that it too, like the NPFL, laid a claim to power
when Doe and the rump of his government still occupied the
presidential mansion.10° Hence, consistent with the rule of international
law that hasty recognition of rebels should be avoided until they have
consolidated their hold over a State, the OAU's recognition of IGNU
was obviously wrong. 01
Therefore, the answer to why the OAU recognized INGU as the
government of Liberia lies, arguably, in an examination of the political
interests of key players in the Liberian crisis. Most Members of
ECOWAS wanted to see the NPFL's rebellion fail. If the rebels,
essentially a civilian army, had succeeded in their undertaking this
could provoke similar uprisings in the other West African countries.0 2
98. See Kofi Oteng Kufuor, Developments in the Resolution of the Liberian
Conflict, 10 AM. U.J. INrr'L L. & PoL'Y 373, 374 (1994) (providing the boundaries
of territory controlled by the ECOWAS-IGNU alliance). Although ECOMOG did
succeed in pushing the NPFL out of Monrovia, the only real threat to the NPFL's
power came from the numerous guerilla movements that sprang up over Liberia
during the conflict.
99. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN IN'ERNATIONAL LAW, 93-94
(Cambridge, University Press, 1947).
100. See da Costa, supra note 95, at 2438 (reporting that NPFL occupied
Monrovia but failed to occupy the presidential mansion).
101. See Lauterpacht, supra note 99, at 92 (claming that premature recognition
of a rebellious group is essentially a tort committed against the lawful
government).
102. See Gilbert da Costa, Fresh Inpetusfor Peace, W. AFR., Nov. 16, 1992, at
1968 (reporting the events of a meeting in Nigeria on the Liberian crisis). At a
meeting of ECOWAS President Babangida and the Nigerian Head of State
emphasized the self-defense aspect of the intervention when they asserted possible
future effects of Taylor's uprising, stating, "Today it is Liberia, tomorrow it could
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In effect, African leaders' concerns regarding the 1980 Liberian
recognition question were played out as civilian armies were
compromising regional security. The OAU obviously bowed to
pressure from ECOWAS when it accepted the IGNU as the delegation
from Liberia. It was clear that the OAU sacrificed the rule of law in
order to assuage the misgivings of some of its members.
VI. SIERRA LEONE
The recognition practice of the OAU underwent a radical
transformation in the wake of events in Sierra Leone during 1997.
Army officers overthrew the democratically elected civilian
government of Sierra Leone, with Tejan Kabbah as president, after it
had been in power for aproximately a year."3 The OAU condemned
the coup and refused to recognize the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council ("AFRC") as the de facto government of Sierra Leone. The
OAU justified its position on the basis of Kabbah being a popularly
elected president. °4 Although preserving democracy in Africa had
never been a raison d'Etre for non-recognition of a revolutionary
government, the AFRC coup occurred at a time when elected civilian
governments were starting to re-emerge as the norn." 5 In effect, this
was the beginning of the OAU's policy of not recognizing regimes that
overthrow constitutional democracies.
be any one of the countries represented here. Indeed the canker we are fighting
against is already showing itself in Sierra Leone and in other parts of the sub-
region." Id.
103. See Sierra Leone: A New Democratic Era, 33 AFR. RES. BULL. 12,191
(1996) (reporting the election results and potential conflicts resulting from those
results). Sierra Leone elected Tejan Kabbah president in March 1996. Se Sierra
Leone: A Coup in Freetown?, W. AFR., June 2, 1997, at 887 (describing the coup that
attempted to bring military rule back to Sierra Leone after a year of civilian rule).
104. See Sierra Leone: A New Democratic Era, supra note 103 (providing that
Kabbah was elected with 60% of the vote and his party will have a controlling
interest in the National Assembly, holding 51 of 80 seats).
105. See generallv JOHN A. WISEMAN, THE NEW STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN
AFRICA (Ashgate Publishing Company, Avery 1996) (discussing the movement
towards democracy in Africa). But see Richard Joseph, Africa. 1990-1997: IFrom
Arbetura to Closure, 9 J. OF DEMOCRACY, 1998, at 3-17: Letitia Lawson, External
Democracy Promotion in Africa: Another False Start? 37 COMMONWEALTtl &
COMP. POL., 1-30 (1999) (arguing that the transition to democracy has not been
that successful).
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Further, it was doubtful if the AFRC could claim that the bulk of the
population had consented to its assumption of power.' Moreover, the
AFRC did not have effective control over Sierra Leone as ECOMOG,
and the Kamajors, a militia loyal to the ousted president, competed
with it for control of the country. 07 ECOMOG's role was also driven
by Nigeria's desire to expand its importance in West Africa"' and to
cloak its then military government, seen by the international
community as a pariah regime, with some form of legitimacy.' " This
would have enabled the Nigerian junta to justify its claim, though
patently spurious, that it was committed to liberal democracy.' I
VII. THE OAU DECLARATION ON THE
RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS
The above analysis demonstrates that illegality, inconsistency, and a
lack of transparency characterize the OAU's recognition process. This
lack of transparency is visible in a number of ways. First, the OAU
recognition deliberations are not open to the public and recorded
minutes for such deliberations are unavailable."' Second, the OAU's
Charter makes no provision for the recognition of governments." It
also does not permit the suspension or expulsion of governments."
Article 3(2) further prohibits the OAU from interfering in the internal
affairs of its Members, and yet the recognition controversies have
106. See John Bankole, A Countrv on Trial. W. APR., July 6, 1998, at 576;
Sierre Leone: Koroina Pleads, W. AFR., June 16, 1997, at 952 (reporting on
popular resistance to the AFRC by civilians in Sierra Leone).
107. See Yusef Bangura, Security in ECO WAS. W. AFR., June 30, 1997, at 1038
(reporting on the popular resistance to the AFRC by civilians in Sierra Leone); see
also Sierra Leone: Nigerian Interv'ention Fails. 34 AFR. RES. BULL. 12,711,
12,735 (1997) (reporting that the Kamajors controlled most of the south and east of
the country in 1997).
108. See generally http://news i .thdo.bbc.co.uklhi/englisli'world' analysis
newsid_55000/55993.stm (last visited May 13. 2001).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See generally OAU CHARTER, supra note 5 (providing no requirements for
the recording of deliberations).
112. See id. (making no mention of new government recognition).
113. Id. (requiring respect for the independence of each nation).
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amounted to a disregard for Article 3(2). Also, effective control has not
always been a deciding factor in the seating of delegations at OAU
meetings. "
Third, recognition has been swayed by the influence of various OAU
chairmen or regional powers. Thus, as we have seen, in the wake of the
overthrow of Milton Obote, Goukhouni Oueddei, and William Tolbert,
the OAU chairman, host countries managed to exert considerable
influence on deliberations over recognition."I5 In effect, the process has
been more the rule of personality then the rule of law and each incident
has seen the OAU lurch from one position to another." 16 Consequently,
this lack of consistency has produced a situation where the OAU
refused to recognize the AFRC as the government of Sierra Leone,
while welcoming Denis Sassou-Nguesso at OAU meetings after he had
subverted democracy in Congo Brazzaville." I7
As noted above, however, the OAU has placed the question of
recognition of governments on its agenda. At the OAU Summit in
Algiers a decision was taken to reactivate the OAU sub-committee on
unconstitutional change in order to finalize work with regard to the
overthrow of elected regimes in its Member states.'" An OAU
114. See sup-a notes 43-47 (discussing the matter of effective control with regard
to the recognition of a delegation from Uganda); see also supra notes 75-80
(reiterating the controversy surrounding the seating of the delegation from Chad,
where effective control did not result in automatic acceptance by the OAU).
115. See OAU CHARTER, sup-a note 5, art. 3(2) (pointing out that this influence
violates the Charter because it demands that the OAU refrain from interfering in
internal affairs of its Member States).
116. See sup-a, note 43 (discussing the politics behind the non-recognition of
the Ugandan coup).
117. See The Congo: Fighting Breaks Out, W. AFR., June 16, 1997, at 953
(reporting clashes between supporters of Sassou-Nguesso and supporters of
Lissouba); Congo Brazzaville, W. AFR., Oct. 20, 1997, at 1655 (announcing the
planned swearing in of Sassou-Nguesso). In 1997, Denis Sassou-Nguesso
challenged the authority of the elected president of Congo-Brazzaville, Pascal
Lissouba. For thirteen years Congo-Brazzaville had been a one-party state under
Sassou-Nguesso. However, bending to pressure for political change, Sassou-
Nguesso agreed to multiparty elections. This resulted in his defeat by Lissouba in
1992. However, rivalry between the two led to a civil war in June of 1997 and the
victory of Sassou-Nguesso's forces in October of that year. Given the zeal with
which the OAU supported Kabbah in Sierra Leone, it was surprising that the OAU
never condemned Sassou-Nguesso. Id.
11 8. See Joe Branford Nyinah, Coups Out, Democracy In, W. AFR., July 24,
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Declaration adopted after a meeting in Lome followed this decision." '
The Lome Declaration noted that coups were a disturbing trend and
contributed to the erosion of democracy in Africa.' 20 The OAU
Members also agreed on a set of principles as the basis for the
articulation of common values and principles for democratic
governance. Included in these principles are respect for the constitution
of a Member, 12' democratic change, the recognition of a role for the
opposition, 122 and the organization of free and regular elections.ir
The Declaration considers unconstitutional change of government to
occur where a democratically elected government is overthrown either
through a coup d' etat, 24 by mercenaries, 25 by armed dissident groups
and rebel movements, 26 or when there is the refusal by an incumbent
government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair,
and regular elections. 127 The Declaration also states that illegal regimes
will be given six months to restore constitutional order. 12' After the
expiration of this six-month period, during which the illegal regime
will be suspended from the policy-making organs of the OAU,"' a
range of sanctions will be instituted against it.'"" Sanctions could
include denial of visas for members of the government in question,
restriction of government-to-government contacts, or trade
2000, at 12 (focusing on the OAU's attempt to maintain more influence over
unconstitutional changes in control in its member countries).
119. See DECLARATION OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR AN OAU RESPONSL TO
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT. A-lG/DECL.5 (XXXVI) (July
2000) [hereinafter DECLARATION] (condemning any unconstitutional change of
government in OAU states).
120. See id. at pmbl. (expressing concerns about recent coups in Africa).
121. Id. at 3.
122. Id. at 4.
123. Id. at 4.
124. DECLARATION,supra note 119, at 4.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 5.
128. Id. at 5-6.
129. DECLARATION, supra note 119, at 5.
130. Id. at 6-7
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restrictions.' 31
The Declaration gives the Secretary-General the duty of gathering
facts relevant to an unconstitutional change of government. 3 The
Secretary-General should also establish appropriate contacts with the
perpetrators in order to ascertain their intentions with regard to
restoring constitutional rule. 33 African leaders and personalities may
also be consulted by the Secretary-General in the discharge of his
duties under the Declaration.'34 African leaders and personalities
should be asked to help put pressure on the perpetrators to cooperate
with the OAU.
In order to give effect to the Declaration, the OAU has decided that
existing OAU mechanisms, particularly the Central Organ of the OAU
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution
("the Central Organ") 35  will be the instrument for its
implementation. 36 The Secretary-General should determine the best
way to enhance the role of the Central Organ to enable it to implement
the Declaration. 3 The OAU's Members agreed to establish a Central
Organ sanctions sub-committee responsible for monitoring compliance
with decisions with respect to situations of unconstitutional changes.'
The sub-committee should also recommend appropriate review
measures to the OAU's Policy Organs. '"
On its face, the Declaration is a meaningful step towards promoting
131. Id.
132. Id. at 6.
133. Id.
134. See DECLARATION, sutpra note 119, at 6.
135. See Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, 6
AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 149, 158-160 (1994) (establishing the Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution as a means of anticipating and
preventing conflicts in Africa). The Mechanism is "built around the Central Organ
with the Secretary General and the Secretariat serving as its operational arm." i.
at 160. The Central Organ is "composed of the States members of the Bureau of'
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government." Id.
136. See DECLARATION, supra note 119, at 7 (giving the Central Organ the
authority to implement OAU responses to unconstitutional changes in Africa.)
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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constitutional democracy and the rule of law in Africa. However, the
Declaration's underlying theme should be reinforced by expanding on
the preconditions for the non-recognition of an unconstitutional regime.
To achieve its objective, the OAU should set basic rules with regard to
non-recognition of governments that come to power by overthrowing
constitutional regimes.
VIII. PROPOSALS FOR THE REFORM OF THE LAW
RELATING TO THE RECOGNITION OF
UNCONSTITUTIONAL REGIMES
First, as noted above, a government that has been installed as a
result of a free and fair election and that respects its citizens'
fundamental human rights will be recognized by the OAU as the
government of its country, even if it is overthrown by armed forces and
the new regime is in effective control.4 0 It is interesting to note that the
Declaration has guarded against so-called illiberal democracies
exploiting the OAU's new position to entrench themselves in power.'4 '
An illiberal democracy occurs in a situation in which elected
democratic regimes regularly disregard the constitutional restraints on
their authority and, as a consequence, violate their citizens'
fundamental human rights.'4 2 This is the case in many states that have
supposedly swung from totalitarianism and authoritarianism towards
constitutional rule and liberal democracy.'4
Realizing this potential problem, the Declaration lists a number of
values and principles deemed to underpin democratic government in
140. See id. at 2-5 (outlining the situations that could be considered
unconstitutional change of government and the actions the OAU will take in
response to those unconstitutional changes).
141. See id. at 1-4 (introducing values and principles to promote democratic
institutions and reduce risks of unconstitutional change).
142. See Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 FOREIGN AtF. 22,
22 (1997) (observing a growing phenomenon of illiberal democracies around the
world).
143. See id. at 28 (introducing examples of countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America where rapid democratisation without liberal governance have lead to
illiberal regimes).
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Africa.'44 The values include the adoption of a democratic constitution;
respect for the Constitution and parliamentary legislation; the
separation of powers and judicial independence; the promotion of
political pluralism and acknowledging the role of civil society; the
principle of democratic change with a clear role of political opposition;
free and regular elections; freedom of expression and freedom of the
press; constitutional recognition of fundamental human rights in
conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Banjul Charter);
and the guarantee and promotion of human rights. 4
Implicitly, reference to the Banjul Charter indicates that to enjoy
recognition as the legitimate government, an ousted administration
should have a consistent record of respect for, and compliance with,
decisions of its domestic courts.'46 In addition, the government should
also have demonstrated its commitment to the protection of the rights
of its citizens. Thus, for example, it should not just be a party to the
Banjul Charter, as envisaged in the Declaration. 7 Rather, the
government claiming legitimacy from the OAU should have regularly
complied with the Charter's provisions on the submission of periodic
reports to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. It
should also have accepted in good faith the determinations of the
African Commission regarding communications filed before it.
In addition, the OAU should stress that under no circumstances
should the overthrown government have denied access to a human
rights fact-finding mission or on-site study by the African Commission,
United Nations, or where applicable, the Commonwealth or a similar
144. See DECLARATION, supra note 119, at 3-4.
145. Id.
146. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 REV. 5 (198 1), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
147. DECLARATION, supra note 119, at 4.
148. See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 146, at 63,
68 (establishing that under Articles 30 and 62 each state party must submit a report
every two years that consists of legislative or other material that "give effect to the
rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed by the present Charter" to the
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights). But see EVELYN A.
ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGIIS:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, 108-09 (1996) (discussing the problems of non-
compliance in the submission of reports and overdue reports).
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inter-governmental organization.'49 Also, the regime should ratify or
accede to the newly established African Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights, 150 and through a declaration, it should accept the competence of
the Court to receive non-state petitions.
The OAU's new policy applies only to democratically elected
governments.' This principle should be extended to current
undemocratic regimes. There are still a number of countries where the
government is not accountable to its people through periodic elections.
If there is a coup d'etat or successful civil war in such a country, the
OAU's policy on recognition should come into play. Here, the OAU
should grant provisional recognition to the new regime and insist on a
transfer of power to an elected civilian administration within a time
frame acceptable to the OAU.'12 However, if any member of the new
military administration wins the presidency while the junta still holds
office, then the OAU policy should be that unless the electoral process
is declared to be fair by international observers it will not grant
recognition to the new government because it would be a continuation
of the military junta.'53
149. See Ankumah, id. at 114-15 (describing the difficulties of the African
Commission in conducting fact-finding missions due to obstacles erected by
African governments such as Malawi under president Banda and Zaire under
Mobutu).
150. See Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on
the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, reprinted in 9
AFR. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 593 (1997) (memorializing an agreement between
African nations to protect the human rights of their citizens).
151. See Declaration, supra note 119, at 1-7 (setting forth the principals on
democratic governance).
152. On many occasions military regimes have drawn out the return to
constitutional rule. For instance Nigeria's transition to democracy after the coup of
1983 dragged on until 1999.
153, The tendency of incumbent coup-makers to contest or try to contest
elections is well known in Africa. See Ronald Allen. Strasser Ousted in Palace
Coup, W. AFR., Jan. 22, 1996, at 102 (describing the removal of Captain Valentine
Stresser due to "his attempt to impede the democratic process" in Sierra Leone);
Gambia: Jainmeh Elected President, W. AFR.. Sept. 30. 1996, at 1540 (reporting
the opposition leader, Ousainou Darboe's flight to take refuge in the Senegalese
Embassy in order to avoid the unrest following the elections). This practice is not
limited to the 1980's and 1990's. See Ghana: General AInkrah's Resignation, 6
AFR. REs. BULL. 1376 (1969) (describing General Ankrah's resignation resulting
from the collection of illegal funds).
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The OAU's criteria should also be procedurally transparent,
especially in the instance of a coup leader seeking recognition after the
overthrow of a supposedly democratic government. As we have seen,
OAU deliberations on recognition have been held in camera."' Thus,
there should also be a provision for oral statements and any counter-
claims by organizations with observer status at the OAU, the deposed
regime, or the new government seeking recognition. The OAU should
also be obliged to consider the reports of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights concerning any state-sponsored human
rights abuses by the ousted applicant-government. Reports on tile
government's compliance with judgments of the African Court
(whenever it becomes operative) should also be considered in deciding
whether to withhold or grant recognition.
During the Chad controversy, an attempt to create a credentials
committee to deal with the question of competing delegations failed.' 55
The rules of procedure of the Council of Ministers state that each
Member must provide a list of its accredited delegates in advance of a
Council meeting. 5 6 The rules, however, fail to state what should
happen if there is more than one list due to rival claims from different
factions. Accordingly, a credentials committee should be empowered
to make recommendations to the OAU on the issue of recognition. The
Council of Ministers or the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government 57 should act on the report submitted by the credentials
committee. A two-thirds majority vote should be required if either of
these institutions chooses to ignore the credentials committee's report.
The report of the credentials committee and the reasons for any
rejection of a claim by the AHSG or Council of Ministers should be
made public.
Furthermore, the credentials committee should be able to consult any
154. See OAU CHARTER, supra note 5, arts. 7, 9 (stating that the Council of
Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government deliberations are to
be held in camera).
155. See Twelve Da's that Shook the OAU, W. AFR., Dec. 6, 1982, at 3127
(detailing the events that led to the attempt and failure of the credentials committee
during the Nineteenth summit of the OAU).
156. See OAU CHARTER, supra note 5, rule 5 (providing that each Member State
communicate to the Council of Ministers a list of its duly accredited delegation).
157. See OAU CHARTER, supra note 5, art. 7 (setting forth the principal
institutions of the OAU including the Assembly of Heads of State).
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individual, national organization, government, as well as any regional
or international organizations as part of its recommendation process.
The power of consultation, therefore, should not be left to the OAU
Secretary-General as provided for in the Declaration.' s When
necessary, the credentials committee should also have the power to
conduct a fact-finding mission on its ovn volition to help it arrive at a
fair and impartial determination on recognition. Additionally, the
importance of the Chairman of the OAU or Council of Ministers
should be diminished. As we have seen in the case of Chad, the
Chairman can exert considerable influence on the recognition of a
delegation.15 9 Therefore, reducing the role of the Chairman of both
institutions in specific relation to the issue of recognition could result in
a more equitable conclusion by the credentials committee.'O
Thomas Franck argues that the entitlement to democracy in
international law has undergone a normative and customary
evolution.1 6' It has evolved both as a system of rules in the practice of
States and organizations. 62 Franck identifies three distinct phases of
change. 63 The first stage had as its essence the normative entitlement
to self-determination. 6t The normative entitlement to free expression
as a human right marked the second stage. 6- Franck argues that the
advent of a normative right to a participatory electoral process is the
158. But see Declaration, supra note 119, at 6 (providing that the Secretary-
General should obtain the contribution of African leaders and personalities as part
of the process of pressurizing the illegitimate government to restore constitutional
order).
159. See supra part IV (discussing the case of Chad and the seating of their
delegation).
160. But see Declaration, sup-a note 119. at 5 (empowering the Current
Chairman of the OAU and the Secretary General to condemn any unconstitutional
change of government, warn perpetrators that such change is unacceptable, and
request a meeting of the Central Organ to consider situations that could be
construed as an unconstitutional change of government).
161. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992) (explaining that while the ideas that seemed radical at
the time of signing the Declaration of Independence in this country remain radical
notions at the international level, they are quickly becoming more normative).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 90.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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pillar of the third stage. 66 African organizations have in recent times
acknowledged this entitlement. 67 Hence, in 1990 the OAU issued a
Declaration entitled "The Political and Socio-Economic Situation in
Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World.
This Declaration acknowledged the importance of democracy and its
link with development, 69 attaching the proviso, however, that African
countries were entitled to determine their own systems of democracy
based on their socio-cultural values. 70
In addition, other African regional organizations have issued
declarations on democracy. In a series of resolutions, the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights asserted that the right to
democratic governance applies to Africa. The Commission issued
further resolutions on the Military,' Nigeria, 7 2 Gambia,'73 and the
Human Rights Situation in Africa, stating that the military overthrow
of an elected government threatens human rights and the rule of law in
Africa. 174
166. Id.
167. See Organization of African Unity: Annual Summit (Addis Ababa), 27 AF:R.
RES. BULL. 9747 (1990) (stating the recognition of the relationship between
democracy and development amongst heads of state and government participating
the 26th OAU Summit).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 9748.
171. See Sixteenth Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, Banjul, The Gambia, 83 (1994) (stating in the Preamble the
declarations of the Commission regarding governments of African countries). The
Commission encourages military governments to instill power in the hands of a
democratic government. Id.
172. See id. at 84-85 (calling upon the Nigerian military government to respect the
right of free participation in government and the right to self-determination and hand
over the government to duly elected representatives of the people without unnecessary
delay).
173. See id. at 86-87 (resolving that the military coup in Gambia is a flagrant
and grave violation of the right of the Gambian people to freely choose their
government and requesting the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council to
transfer power to freely elected representatives of the people).
174. See id. at 87-88 (stating that the Commission condemns the planning or
execution of Coups d'Etat and any attempt to seize power by undemocratic means,
and calls upon all African governments to ensure that elections and electoral
processes are transparent and fair).
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The OAU's emerging practice is consistent with historical and
contemporary trends regarding the recognition of governments.
Although constitutional legitimacy of a government is not a condition
for recognition,'75 as noted in the Tinoco Arbitration, recent and past
practice of states point to the fact that the right of rebellion has never
been fully accepted. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe's support for democracy at its Copenhagen Meeting in 1990
and the Tobar Doctrine are examples of states committing themselves
to actively work towards the support and protection of liberal
democratic regimes.'76 Further, it shows that such regimes deny
recognition to extra-constitutional governments.'77 The United Nations
support for the restoration of Jean Bertrand Aristede to power in Haiti
after the overthrow of his constitutional regime by the armed forces is
another indication of the fact that constitutional legitimacy is emerging
as an important pre-condition for recognition. 7
175. See Convention Between the British Government and the Government of
Cost Rica for the Submission to Arbitration of Certain Claims Against the
Government of Costa Rica, Jan. 12, 1922, 1 REP. IN'T'L. ARB. AWARDS 371, 381
(arguing that a de facto government should be recognized if it -'maintains a
peaceful administration, with the acquiescence of the people for a substantial
period of time.. ." and should not have to follow the previous constitution).
176. See generally Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe:
Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference of the Human
Dimension, 29 I.L.M. 1305-21 (1990) [hereinafter Copenhagen Document] (laying
out the participating States' commitment and recognition of democracy and
political pluralism).
177. See generally Additional Treaty to the Treaty of Peace Concluded at the
Central American Conference, Dec. 20, 1907, S. Treaty Doc. No. 357 (1776-1909)
(rejecting any government that comes into power through a coup d'etat or a
revolution against the recognized government). After a period of serious instability
in Central America, the Central American nations adopted in 1907 an agreement,
among others, in which they agree not to recognize new unconstitutional regimes
in Central America. The signatories to this agreement stated that before recognition
is granted there should be a collective or multilateral appraisal of the constitutional
validity of a new regime. This doctrine, called the Tobar Doctrine, named for
Carlos R. Tobar, a former foreign minister of Ecuador introduced a principle of
collective recognition. See Donald Marquand Dozer, Recognition in Contemporary
hzter-Anierican Relations, 8 J. INTER-AM. STUD. 318, 321 (1966) (explaining the
origins of the Tobar doctrine).
178. See generally S. Res. 875, U.N. SCOR, 3293th Sess., U.N. Doc. SIRES
875; S. Res. 917, U.N. SCOR, 3376th Sess.. U.N. Doc. S/RES 917; S. Res. 940,
U.N. SCOR, 3413th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES 940 (setting forth the United Nation's
stance on the illegal de facto regime in Haiti and the goal in restoring democracy in
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Some observers might argue that the OAU cannot act decisively on
the recognition of democratic governments, as most of its Members are
either undemocratic (i.e. they have not been elected through universal
adult suffrage in the context of a multi-party system) or the
government's commitment to democracy is spurious. While this
observation may be true, it is also a fact that recent political change in
Africa has resulted in a situation in which, as noted above, a number of
genuine democracies are emerging as a result of democratic elections.
Thus countries such as Benin'79 and Madagascar"') are joining the
already established democracies of Mauritius and Botswana. These
states can form the core of a group within the OAU committed to the
promotion of democracy and the non-recognition of governments that
overthrow elected regimes.
Also, the non-recognition of governments could result in the OAU
becoming an organization that is dominated by governments-in-exile.
If, however, the OAU is firm on its policy of recognition, this coukl
serve as a deterrent to future coup makers and thus eliminate the fear
of the OAU becoming an organization with Members that are not de
facto governments. Moreover, to encourage liberal democratic
regimes, it should be possible for international organizations and
States that have insisted on democracy in Africa to compensate the
OAU for any income lost as a result of the continued recognition of
an ousted democratic regime.
CONCLUSION
The recent coup attempt in Burundi,' the overthrow of Pascal
Lissouba's government in Congo Brazzaville, and the coup that
Haiti by returning the legitimately elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristid).
179. See Themon Djaksam, Kjrkou is Back. W. AFR., Apr. 15, 1996, at 584
(detailing democratic practice in Benin under the leadership of President Mathicu
K~r6kou); Kate Whiteman, The Chameleon Returns, W. AIR., Apr. I, 1996. at 498
(reporting the return of Mathieu K6r~kou as President of Benin).
180. See Madagascar: Ratsirika Comeback, 34 AFR. RES. BULL. 12,559 (1977)
(describing the outcome of the national elections and Admiral Didier Ratrsiraka's
victory as President).
181. See http://www.cnn.com/200 1/WORL.D/africa/04/18/burundi.unrest.o2/
(last visited May 13, 2001 ).
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deposed Henri Bedie's regime in C6te d'Ivoire -' 2 are indicative of the
fact that the phenomenon of coups, something observers of African
politics thought had ended, is still a feature of that continent's political
landscape.'83 Moreover, there was no response by the OAU to the
overthrow of Lissouba and so far only a condemnation of the coup in
C6te d'Ivoire.'84
The analysis and proposals in this paper seek to contribute to the
discussion on how the OAU can deal with the overthrow of
constitutional regimes. For the OAU to be a meaningful institution
that contributes to political stability and development in Africa, and
thus help to arrest the progressively debilitating conditions on the
continent, it must be an engine of democracy on the continent. It can
be that engine if it adheres to and constructively reinforces its
emerging position on the recognition of governments.
182. See C6te D 'Ivoire: Is it Africa "s *Good Coup'?, NEw AFR., Feb. 2000, at 10
(commentating on the OAU's reaction to the coup in C6te D'lvoire after making
the recent announcement of outlawing all coups), see also C6te D 'Ivoire: Ecowas'
Somersault, NEW AFR., Feb. 2000. at 13 (reporting on ECOWAS' justifications in
its failure to act as it had done in Sierra Leone in 1997 on the grounds that forcibly
reinstating the government would have been unpopular with Ivorians).
183. See Banjul, Gambia, W. AFR., Jan. 24. 2000, at 37 (describing efforts of the
Gambia government to squash a planned coup by the Gambia state guards).
184. See supra note 182.
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